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It would seem justifiable to write a paper about the history of either the New party or 
the Communist party of Great Britain (CPGB). But a paper on the relationship 
between the two might be thought to court ridicule. As The Times’s editorial put it in 
reviewing the October 1931 general election results, ‘the New Party shared with the 
Communist Party the fate of providing a certain comic relief by polling a bare handful 
of votes wherever they put forward a candidate’.1 Rather like multiplying fractions, the 
end result of looking at the two parties together might be thought likely to result in a 
sum less than the original amounts. This verdict would appear to be supported by the 
fact that virtually all the standard texts on the CPGB ignore the New party,2 a neglect 
which repeats that found in the memoirs of leading Communists.3 In fact, however, 
the New party was not without significance in the development of the Communist 
party.  
 
The CPGB had been formed as the British section of the Moscow-based Communist 
International (Comintern) in August 1920. It had been intended to supercede the 
‘reformist’ Labour party and ultimately to lead a British revolution, but its first decade 
had brought little but disappointment, and membership prior to 1926 rarely reached 
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5,000.4 In 1926, the General Strike and mining lockout brought a boost, and 
membership reached 12,000 that October; but the new members fell away once the 
coal dispute ended, and by January 1928 the figure was back down to 5,000. By that 
time, too, the party’s ‘united front’ strategy of trying to work through the Labour party 
and the trade unions was paying fewer and fewer dividends. In Moscow, meanwhile, 
the emphasis was turning towards a much harsher line against social democrats. 
This deemed that, far from being potential allies in the fight against capitalism, social 
democrats were now to be seen as enemies, not potential allies. Capitalism, it was 
believed, was moving into a new stage of crisis, which would see social democrats 
siding with the capitalists, thus revealing themselves as ‘social fascists’. The workers’ 
only true friend, therefore, was the Communist party. The adoption of this new ‘class 
against class’ line by the British party was a protracted and contested affair, but by 
1929 it was firmly in place.  
 
Ostensibly, the context for the new line could hardly have been better. The British 
economy moved into severe recession in late 1929, suggesting to Communists that 
capitalism was, indeed, in headlong decline. In theory, capitalists would seek 
measures to sustain profits, such as wage cuts, tariffs and rationalisation, with 
increasing desperation. This would, first, immiserate, and so radicalise, the workers; 
and, secondly, lead to heightened international tension, and an increased risk of war, 
especially against the Soviet Union. In this crisis, the analysis continued, the social 
democratic leaders would gradually peel away from the workers’ movement, sooner 
or later siding with the capitalists as the crisis intensified. In the final analysis, so far 
as the workers were concerned, Labour politicians were no better than Conservatives 
or Liberals, since they all stood to sustain capitalism. Leftist social democrats, or 
‘sham lefts’, were seen as particularly treacherous because their language was 
similar to the Communists’ and so harder to ‘expose’. In the British context, the ‘sham 
lefts’ were especially identified with people like James Maxton on the left wing of the 
 3 
Independent Labour party (ILP), who were moving increasingly towards open conflict 
with the leadership of the Labour party (to which the ILP was still formally affiliated). 
At the May 1929 general election the Communists were unable to run more than a 
handful of candidates, and advised their supporters who did not have a Communist 
to vote for to abstain, because Labour was no better than its opponents: ‘[o]n 
questions of principle there [was] no difference between the three [main] parties’.5 In 
fact, however, the election of the second Labour government was, in theory at least, 
a boost to the new line, because Labour in office would be forced to make hard 
choices and struggle to balance conflicting interests in the face of the ‘economic 
blizzard’. Indeed its support for industrial rationalisation ought to have played into the 
Communists’ analysis very neatly.6  
 
As usual, however, events failed to fit the Communists’ finely-tuned theories. 
Unemployment rose dramatically in 1930, but worker militancy did not. CPGB 
membership, far from rising, fell to an all-time low of 2,350 that August; Comintern 
officials despaired.7 Ultra-leftism in relation to the ‘reformist’ trade unions had led to 
largely abortive efforts to create ‘red’ unions on the German model, while Daily 
Worker circulation was ‘stagnant’.8 It was with commendable understatement that 
William Gallacher told the party’s ruling political bureau (PB) at the start of 1931 that 
‘it was clear [they] were in a very difficult situation’.9 On the other hand, as the party’s 
general secretary, Harry Pollitt, told the PB on 12 February 1931, the party had hit 
‘rock bottom’ and could hardly fall lower.10  
 
This, for the Communists, was the context in which the formation of the New party 
was announced. They could hardly ignore the new development. Mosley had been 
the most sensational figure of British politics in 1930, and the ‘pampered aristocrat of 
Labour’ was very much in Communist sights by the time the New party was being 
formed; the Communists were not so out of touch that they failed to notice him 
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marching around the British political stage with what Rajani Palme Dutt, the party’s 
chief theoretician, later described as ‘the complacency of an infant peacock’.11 
Another leading Communist, J. T. Murphy, had offered a characteristically forthright 
view of Mosley’s performance at the 1930 Labour party conference at Llandudno, 
arguing that he had ‘swept the Conference off its feet’ ‘along the Fascist path’ with 
his calls for ‘action’ and tariffs. Murphy also suggested that other leading Labour 
figures, especially the Transport and General Workers’ Union leader Ernest Bevin, 
agreed with Mosley’s prescriptions:  
In the midst of the Social Fascist Labour Party, naked Fascism has raised its 
head and bids for leadership, gathering around the personalities of Mosley 
and Bevin. The Labour Party is a party in process of disintegration. This is the 
historical significance of the Llandudno Conference.12  
Murphy followed this analysis a couple of months later by attacking the ‘aristocratic 
condescencion [sic]’ of the Mosley Manifesto, the ‘unmistakable Fascist character’ of 
whose proposals had ‘nothing to do with Socialism’. Crucially, as well, Murphy said 
that the ILP was, to all intents and purposes, in agreement with the Manifesto, and 
that it was therefore the Communists’ job to ‘unmask the Mosleys and the Maxtons’.13 
However, the new departure was far from dominating the CPGB’s concerns, and it 
was quite possible for Communists to communicate at length with each other in this 
period without even mentioning it.14  
 
Communists did take a good look at the new body, all the same. It was axiomatic to 
the ‘class against class’ analysis that, in Murphy’s words, ‘as the crisis deepens 
Social-Fascism swiftly evolves to pure Fascism’.15 They hoped to see proof of this in 
the New party, and it was this hope that informed their analysis. When they came to 
discuss the matter on 26 February, three days after news of the party’s launch had 
been reported in the press, PB members could hardly contain themselves. Pollitt 
claimed that intensifying capitalist crisis was causing ‘“Lefts” and Mosley to make 
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new manoeuvres to win leftward moving workers’, and spoke of Mosley’s ‘drives 
towards fascism’. Murphy stressed that Mosley had ‘given a tremendous impetus to 
fascist development’, while William Rust, editor of the Communist Daily Worker, also 
characterised Mosley as a fascist. In this context, it was agreed that the party must 
not only counter Mosley, but that it should also expose the ILP left and fight against 
Arthur Horner, the Communist South Wales miners’ leader, who had fallen out of 
favour with the party leadership over his alleged failure to promote the Communist 
cause in an industrial dispute in his coalfield.16  
 
These discussions were carried on in more detail at the party central committee (CC) 
meeting that followed in mid-March. There, Mosley’s open break with Labour was 
used to taint an even wider group of other people, Pollitt claiming that, because both 
the ILP and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) general council also supported 
various forms of industrial rationalisation, they were in some way complicit in the New 
party venture which, while not ‘a full-blown Mussolini group’, was ‘the first concrete 
form of Fascism in embryo we have had in this country’. As well as ‘the most drastic 
application of capitalist rationalisation’, the new party was defined as fascist because 
of the ‘five dictators’ outlined in the Mosley Manifesto, Mosley’s dismissal of socialism 
as ‘“a catchword”’, and the fact that a Conservative MP Bill Allen, who according to 
Pollitt was ‘known to be an out-and-out Fascist’, had joined. The end result, if Mosley 
had his way, would be ‘full-blown fascism in this country’. J. R. Campbell, one of 
Pollitt’s closest colleagues, stated that Mosley represented ‘a very serious danger at 
the present moment’, because, in abandoning socialist language, ‘Mosleyism’ had 
turned from ‘Social Fascism’ into ‘incipient Fascism’. This point was supported by 
Aitken Ferguson, who claimed that some ILPers were themselves talking about 
leaving the Labour party and forming ‘a new party’ – in effect, smearing the ILP by 
rumour, innuendo and largely unsubstantiated association. Pollitt was careful, 
however, to wind up the discussion with a warning against seeing the New party as ‘a 
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fully fledged fascist group’, repeating that it was ‘the embryo form of fascism, and not 
… fully fledged fascism’.17  
 
These fine distinctions between fascisms that were ‘social’, ‘incipient’, ‘fully fledged’ 
and ‘embryo’ might all seem to be the worst kind of exercise in Comintern theology. 
But they were, in fact, of central importance to the CPGB’s strategy. The formation of 
the New party was important to the Communists. It ‘proved’ that social democracy 
was breaking up, and that some of those who had appeared among its most radical 
elements were moving towards overt fascism, or ‘exposing themselves’, in 
Comintern-speak, as class traitors. However, even the most optimistic Communists 
could not look at the New party and convince themselves that, in and of itself, it was 
likely to make a massive difference to British politics: it was only significant if it could 
be used to tar larger and more significant bodies with the same brush. Its function, in 
Communist eyes, was to help discredit the ‘sham lefts’ of the ILP and the other 
‘social fascists’ in the Labour party more generally (hence the attempts to bring Bevin 
and the TUC general council into the equation). But this would only work effectively 
while Mosley could still be portrayed as having some kind of ongoing relationship 
with the Labour movement. Once he moved to ‘fully-fledged’ fascism, that link would 
be lost. It would not matter that this was the case if other ‘sham lefts’ then began 
similar moves towards ‘incipient fascism’, but if they did not, then the notion of an 
ongoing process of differentiation within the left would itself be discredited. In short, 
Mosley could best serve the Communist party’s ‘third period’ analysis and purposes if 
he could be shown to be on the cusp between ‘embryo’ and ‘fully-fledged’ fascism. 
As the CC’s resolution put it:  
The Labour Party, Trades Union Congress and ILP leaders are the forces of 
Social Fascism, and the Mosley group is the continuation of this process, 
which today, reveals itself as the first embryo Fascist Party that has the 
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greatest significance and dangers for the working class, because it has 
developed out of the “Left Wing” section of the Labour Government. 
The New party was ‘a disorganising force employed by capitalism to head off and 
divert the growing discontent in the Labour Party and all parts of the population, and 
draw it to the policy of capitalism under deceitful, high-sounding phrases’.18 For the 
CPGB, ‘social fascism’ remained the main target. On 9 April, the Scottish district 
party committee (DPC) passed a resolution repeating the assertion that the ILP, 
Labour and the TUC were ‘forces of Social Fascism preparing the way for Fascism’, 
and that ‘[o]ut of their ranks comes the Mosley Party driving towards the creation of a 
mass Fascist Party in Great Britain’.19 In late April 1931, Pollitt was reheating 
yesterday’s leftovers in suggesting that the ILP, the general council and the New 
party might all come together to form an ‘Independent Socialist Party’, while it said 
much for the depth of contempt in which some leading Communists held Horner in 
the summer of 1931 that they spread rumours that he was on the verge of joining the 
New party.20 Suggestions that the party leadership should take a closer look at the 
New party, especially in the light of the development of the Nazis in Germany, 
‘because we can see in the New Party something which is going to learn a great deal 
from the Nazis’, came to little.21  
 
This was, in part, because the New party appeared to be doing the CPGB little direct 
damage. There were some clashes at the Ashton by-election in April and May 1931, 
where the Communists ran a propaganda campaign but no candidate as such; but 
Labour remained the Communists’ main target.22 Additionally, it does not seem that 
the New party ate seriously into the CPGB’s membership, although Jack Jones, the 
New party propagandist at Ashton, was assisted by two erstwhile Communists who 
had been leaders of the unemployed movement in nearby Manchester: ‘[a] pair of 
rough handfuls they were, who had hunger-marched and protested their way even 
into prison more than once’.23 Margaret McCarthy was to claim that, in north-western 
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England more broadly, most Communists were ‘of poor quality’, and that the few able 
ones left for the New party at this stage.24 But it is hard to be certain of how far this 
was the case, and Lancashire’s identification as one of the party’s four strongest 
areas in 1932 would tend to suggest a degree of exaggeration on her part.  
 
As it became increasingly obvious in the summer of 1931 that its formation was not 
going to be followed by an early ILP breakaway, the New party fell further down the 
CPGB’s list of priorities. In March 1931, the Comintern had defined the party’s chief 
immediate tasks as being to build up a revolutionary trade union opposition through 
the ongoing campaign for the ‘workers’ charter’; to intensify its work within the 
reformist unions; to stabilise the party’s membership level, as the first step towards 
increasing it significantly; to expand the scope and influence of the Daily Worker; and 
to effect a ‘tremendous’ increase its anti-colonial work.25 For a small party also 
aiming to ‘expose’ Labour and the ILP, and a leadership increasingly embroiled in the 
struggle against ‘Hornerism’, this left very little time or space for serious campaigning 
against a New party whose limited potential was exposed by the result of the Ashton 
by-election. Indeed, the New party was ignored in CPGB discussions of both fascism 
and ‘social fascism’ in May 1931.26  
 
The events of August-October 1931 did not lead to any dramatic change in 
Communist views of the New party. Writing in the Communist Review about the 
situation following the Labour government’s collapse, Murphy did not find space in 
eight pages for even the briefest of mentions, and did not make good the omission in 
a piece of similar length in the following month’s edition.27 For many Communists, 
Mosley’s ‘incipient fascism’ looked incipient, not to say insipid, indeed at the side of a 
National government whose immediate programme was defined by a cut in 
unemployment benefits: a typical argument came from Gallacher, who argued three 
days after the new government was formed that it was ‘the first stage in the 
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development towards a fascist dictatorship, the open unification of the forces of the 
capitalist class against the working class’.28 This view was endorsed in the ‘open 
letter’ sent to CPGB members the following day, which, in five closely-typed pages, 
referred not once to Mosley or his party.29 A month later, an even longer 
communication to members was similarly barren of references.30 
 
On 20 September, while winding up the CC’s discussion of the planned general 
election campaign, Pollitt remarked that, at their next meeting in November or 
December, they ‘may be able to record the biggest victories in the history of the Party 
and reap the reward of the work of the Party members of the last two years’.31 For 
neither the first nor the last time, he was to be proved wrong by quite some margin. 
The party came nowhere near winning a single seat; 21 of its 26 candidates lost their 
deposits. Pollitt himself came a poor third in the London East End constituency of 
Whitechapel and St George’s. Of course, Labour’s crushing defeat, following on from 
the collapse of the Labour government, could be seen as a vindication of the class 
against class line, and brought satisfaction to many Communists. However, the 
reality of the National government’s parliamentary dominance militated strongly 
against much rejoicing.32 The CPGB had polled better than the New party (the 
average poll share of Communist candidates was 8.2 per cent, as opposed to the 
New party’s 4.1 per cent), and this fact did accurately represent the relative strength 
of the two organisations.33 But it was scant – if any – comfort to the Communists. The 
New party had not been particularly targeted in the CPGB’s overall campaign. 
Indeed, it was not even mentioned in its general election manifesto.34 Where 
Communists did mention it, it was usually done with a view to discrediting the ILP by 
former association.35 Pollitt himself faced a New party opponent, the boxer ‘Kid’ 
Lewis, at Whitechapel, but focussed his main attacks on Labour and the ‘the National 
Starvation Government’; if Lewis got a mention, it was usually as the third and least 
significant element of an unholy trinity.36  
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However, the general election was not a total non-event for the Communists. First, it 
saw a further increase in membership, which had been rising even before the 
campaign thanks to the party’s hostility to the National government’s expenditure 
cuts: it rose from 2,724 in May 1931 to 3,927 in September, 6,279 in November, and 
peaked at 9,000 in January 1932. Secondly, and more to the point in the context of 
this paper, the election saw grassroots political violence in a number of places.37 This 
was by no means all organised by the Communists, and by no means all of it was 
targeted at Mosley and the New party. But there was sufficient evidence of a cross-
over between the two to suit the purposes of both the Communists, and of Mosley 
himself (in moving closer to a fascist approach to meetings). At the very least, the 
presence of New party candidates gave some grassroots Communists something to 
do (see below).  
 
In most senses, the limited interface between the Communists and the New party 
ended with the 1931 general election. As the New party ‘died on’38 Mosley, most 
Communists did not even feign an interest in it. Key polemical tracts ranging over the 
post-election political situation found no reason to mention Mosley or his party. The 
CPGB faced real challenges in the months that followed, such as trying to retain 
recent recruits, implementing the ‘January resolution’ of 1932, which urged 
Communists back into the ‘reformist’ unions and reorganised the party on the basis 
of four ‘concentration districts’; industrial disputes in the midlands and Lancashire; 
the controversial departure of Murphy; the emergence of a definite Trotskyite 
opposition in the form of the ‘Balham Group’; and the preparations for the first party 
congress for three years in November 1932, an event that would mark Pollitt’s 
confirmation as the party’s pre-eminent leader (by which time Mosley would have 
formed the BUF).39 By early 1932, Mosley’s main purpose, so far as the Communists 
were concerned, was as a stick with which to try to beat the ILP, James Shields 
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stressing to the political bureau that they must ‘bring out the fact [sic] that Mosley 
came from the “left” wing of the ILP’, and Gallacher arguing that the ILP had 
‘provided a jumping-off ground for Mosley’.40 Neither assertion bore much relation to 
historical accuracy, but, then again, the establishment of scholarly verisimilitude was 
not the primary purpose of the discussion. By the end of 1932, with the BUF formed, 
Communists had largely forgotten about the New party. By that time, so far as they 
were concerned, Mosley had been a fascist all along, and they had been proved 
correct in their estimation of him. If Mosley and the New party warranted so little 
discussion in Communists’ memoirs and books on the party, it is surely because the 
whole New party episode appeared both irrelevant and unproblematic to the 
Communists’ own development.  
 
However, to leave matters there is to miss a great deal. The first point to note is that 
the Communists could present Mosley’s political journey from Labour to fascism as 
evidence of their own prescience, and as justification of the ‘class against class’ 
analysis. They took considerable pride in having diagnosed Mosley’s fascism so 
early, at a time when ‘Left Labour politicians rallied to his support and assisted his 
campaign’, as Dutt put it in characteristically tendentious terms in 1934.41 It is true, as 
Francis Beckett has pointed out, that the achievement was ‘not as remarkable as it 
sounds’, because ‘[i]f you call everyone a fascist you must hit a winner eventually’.42 
But, even so, this early identification of Mosley with fascism did help the Communists 
to gain some moral advantage in the anti-fascist campaigns of the mid-1930s.  
 
Secondly, the development of the New party did force the CPGB to pay more 
attention to its youth work. It is in some ways ironic that although the shift to the left in 
the late 1920s had owed much to youthful Communists – Nina Fishman’s ‘young 
turks’ – the Young Communist League (YCL) had fallen into increasing decrepitude.43 
By early 1931, the party leadership was recognising the fact.44 However, it was in 
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discussions of Mosley’s ‘incipient fascism’ that the point really began to make an 
impact. As Pollitt put it, the appeal of Mosley and people like him was ‘always 
directed to the youth of the country’, and so the Communists must work to counter 
such influences by building up the YCL, as well as by trying to infiltrate existing youth 
organisations.45 Increasing emphasis was placed on speaking to young people in 
language they could understand, rather than in what Pollitt referred to as ‘inprecorr 
language’.46 As Campbell put it, the YCL must make ‘a more popular, a more youthful 
approach to youth’, because at present it was ‘worse than listening to Einstein to 
listen to young comrades’.47 All this led to a new steer to the party at large to be more 
tolerant of, and helpful towards, the YCL, and attempts were made to build on some 
promising openings in the field of sporting activity.48 This paid some early dividends, 
and YCL membership did increase.49 It does not seem implausible to argue that this 
new attention to youth was also a factor in helping party membership in general to 
increase later in the year. Of course, many of those new recruits then fell away 
rapidly, and the party would continue to moan about its youth work and the young 
people involved in it.50 But it does seem that the launch of the New party helped to 
focus Communist minds on the subject, at least for a while.   
 
A third consideration is political violence: how far did the CPGB encourage the use of 
political violence against Mosley and the New party? Communist leaders were often 
to be dismissive of such action in the early years of the BUF, believing that it would 
damage the CPGB’s credibility.51 It may be, however, that in the first months of the 
New party’s existence things were different. British Communists returned from visits 
to Germany in 1931 greatly enthused by what they saw of ‘the method of 
revolutionary competition’, believing it was bringing positive results for the KPD.52 
Pollitt was exhilarated by the way in which the German party used ‘every available 
means of approach and contact and every conceivable form of attracting the Young 
Workers’, and in the context of early 1931 he would have been well aware that ‘every 
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conceivable form’ included the use of violence.53 On the fall of the Labour 
government, party members were entreated to take concrete action, rather than just 
come out with floods of rhetoric, and at least some Communists would have seen this 
as a green light to disrupt meetings and the like.54 During the October 1931 general 
election campaign, the party leadership was critical of members who were seen as 
acting too peaceably in demonstrations. Glasgow Communists who had agreed to 
give up their ‘weapons’ (which were actually, as Peter Kerrigan later explained rather 
deflatingly, ‘sticks’) at a large demonstration of the unemployed were strongly 
criticised by the political bureau.55 The fact that Communists were being organised to 
heckle at every ILP meeting in that city was taken as a source of pride.56 From a 
number of parts of Britain there were also reports of Communist violence against 
Labour supporters.57 Naturally, it suited Mosley to be able to claim, at the time and 
afterwards, that his meetings were being disrupted by Communists, because it 
allowed him to portray himself as the guarantor of ‘English’ free speech against the 
‘foreign’ methods of the Communists, while also justifying the creation of an armed 
and uniformed force of stewards to ‘keep order’.58 But that is not to say that the 
notion was entirely fictitious. We know that his meetings were disrupted;59 we know 
that Communists were looking to disrupt their opponents’ meetings; and we know 
that most CPGB members, being unemployed, had time on their hands in which to 
plan and execute such disruption.60 Even at this stage, though, there was Communist 
criticism of what Gallacher called ‘irresponsible’ behaviour.61 It is very difficult to 
imagine many members of the political bureau approving of the conduct of one 
branch secretary in Nottinghamshire who, after calling on workers to join an 
unemployed demonstration that October, allegedly added ‘I am not telling you to 
bring your six-shooters, but I will have mine’.62 However, the leadership of the 
German Communist party (KPD) made a major shift in November 1931 when, under 
the guidance of the Comintern, it ‘began to qualify its approval of fighting back’ 
against the Nazis.63 The resolution that the KPD central committee passed on the 
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subject would certainly have become known very rapidly to the British party 
leadership, and its steer against ‘individual violence’ undoubtedly helps to explain the 
CPGB’s approach between 1932 and mid-1934. Overall, then, it would seem that 
Communists on the ground were involved in anti-Mosley action, sometimes of a 
violent nature; but the New party was not unique in receiving such treatment, 
although the experiences gained by Communists at this time would prove valuable 
once large-scale Communist campaigning against the BUF began.  
 
There is a final and important point. The New party episode also brought the 
Communist party a very valuable windfall, in the shape of John Strachey. Strachey 
had become Mosley’s closest collaborator in the mid-1920s, and was elected Labour 
MP for Birmingham Aston in 1929. He went on to play a major role in drafting both 
the Mosley Memorandum and the Mosley Manifesto, followed Mosley into the New 
party and, along with Lady Cynthia Mosley, addressed its inaugural meeting when 
Mosley himself was too ill to do so. He did not resign from the party until July 1931. 
He fought that October’s general election as an independent with Communist 
support, but was heavily defeated. Thereafter he gravitated towards the CPGB. His 
major publication of 1932, The Coming Struggle for Power, was essentially a detailed 
vindication of third period analysis, and, as is well known, Strachey requested and 
incorporated Dutt’s comments and amendments when the book was in draft. 
Although he appears never formally to have joined the party, this was mainly 
because it suited the party better to be able to claim that he was an independent 
intellectual who had come to agree with the Communist line through force of intellect 
rather than party discipline. He was to continue sending drafts of his work to Dutt and 
other leading Communists, like Pollitt and Emile Burns, for comment.64 His 
subsequent works – The Menace of Fascism (1933), The Nature of Capitalist Crisis 
(1935), The Theory and Practice of Socialism (1936), What Are We To Do? (1938) 
and the pamphlet Why You Should be a Socialist (1938) – were all very influential, 
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far more so than any other British Communist writing of the decade. Why You Should 
be a Socialist, in particular, sold hundreds of thousands of copies, and is generally 
reckoned to have been hugely influential, especially on young people. He was also 
(along with Victor Gollancz and Harold Laski) one of the three selectors for the Left 
Book Club, set up in 1936. His recruitment, in short, was a major coup for the CPGB. 
 
In some ways Strachey’s adhesion to the Communist party could be seen as having 
little directly to do with his earlier involvement with the New party. His motives have 
been investigated in detail in three good biographies, after all, and seem in many 
ways perfectly logical.65 Conviction was important – he does appear to have believed 
for a time that radical change was not only necessary, but inevitable, and that, given 
that the only alternatives really were fascism or communism, he had to choose the 
latter. Career considerations also played a part – having given up on Labour and 
decided that the New party was not for him, it made sense to go towards the 
Communists, not least because they were interested in helping him at Aston and in 
working with him thereafter.  
 
There was, however, a further factor, which helps to explain, not only the initial 
adhesion to the CPGB, but also its subsequent longevity, and the nature of his 
eventual breach with it in 1940. And this was the New party. Strachey was a very 
complex personality. Mosley’s infamous epithet that he was ‘governed above the 
waist by Marx, below the waist by Freud, but no part of [him] by Strachey’ was very 
unkind, but captured a certain essential oddness.66 Following the break with Mosley, 
Strachey feared that the latter might try to have him assassinated, and bought a 
revolver with which to protect himself, while in the autumn of 1932 he had a nervous 
breakdown. He went for therapy thrice-weekly for the next three years.67  
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It does not appear entirely fanciful to suggest that Strachey’s behaviour in the 1930s 
was motivated, in part, by a somewhat feverish desire to be seen to have expunged 
any possible taint of his earlier links with Mosley. This became more and more 
imperative as Mosley moved towards an open embrace of fascism. Strachey himself 
had not been a fascist. But he had been very close to Mosley. He had also stayed 
with Mosley in the New party longer than seemed wise in retrospect. The CPGB had 
condemned the New party’s ‘incipient fascism’ some months before Strachey broke 
with it in July 1931. In retrospect, of course, Strachey developed a narrative that 
suggested a process of revelation: indeed, The Menace of Fascism functioned in part 
as the finalisation of that narrative. There, in an eerie parallel of much Communist 
memoir writing, we see Strachey realising increasingly that something needed to be 
done politically, but casting around in some desperation, unable to find a cure and 
latching on to all kinds of false prophets and panaceas. In Communist 
autobiographies, people like Gallacher, Murphy and Tom Bell portrayed themselves 
as earnest but misguided working-class militants who found ‘truth’ in Communism, in 
all three cases finalised by a meeting with Lenin.68 Strachey did not, of course, meet 
Lenin, but he did meet Raji Dutt and Harry Pollitt.  
 
In Strachey’s final narrative, Mosley returned from his illness in early 1931 a changed 
man, already dubious about the New party’s potential. For Strachey, the moment 
when inchoate fears crystallised into an ‘I meet Lenin’ moment of revelation came 
that May, at the declaration of the by-election result at Ashton Town Hall, in Mosley’s 
notorious reaction to the roars of the ‘violently hostile’ crowd (‘“That is the crowd that 
has prevented anyone doing anything in England since the war”’). ‘At that moment,’ 
Strachey continued, ‘British Fascism was born.’69 Thereafter, ‘Mosley began more 
and more to use the word Fascism in private’.70 By this time, Strachey recounted, he 
and Allen Young were increasingly concerned, and following a clash over the future 
of the ‘youth movement’, they engineered a breach with Mosley. Strachey’s choice of 
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issue was not made at random. It was, as he described it in 1933, ‘that touchstone of 
the modern world, our attitude to Soviet Russia’.71  
 
The details of the dispute are not important here. What matters is that Strachey 
cannot have failed to realise that to break with Mosley on this issue would help to 
ease his way into the Communist party’s good books. It was also the best way in 
which he could prove that he had no truck with fascism. But purging himself of the 
fascist taint would take more than that, as he realised. This helps to explain why he 
stayed with the Communists for so long, indeed long after the prospect of the 
Manichean future depicted in The Coming Struggle for Power had apparently begun 
to recede. By the mid-1930s, Strachey would be looking with increasing interest at 
attempts to improve the lot of the workers within capitalism, with reformist social 
democracy using the fruits of a prospering – albeit far more regulated – capitalism to 
bring about improved living standards en route to socialism. Both Roosevelt’s New 
Deal and Keynes’s ideas, at least as filtered through Douglas Jay and Evan Durbin, 
were to be very significant influences on him.72 Intellectually, he was, in effect, 
breaking with communism, and moving back closer to the ideas of Revolution by 
Reason and the Mosley Memorandum, albeit updated. However, the need for 
atonement for his earlier association with Mosley kept him within the party’s orbit so 
long as there seemed to be no really pressing reason to make a break: the longer he 
stayed, the more he would be able to satisfy others, and perhaps most of all himself, 
that he was no fascist. (Indeed, by 1934 he was already being described by a pro-
Communist writer as the only leading British intellectual who had taken ‘the side of 
the proletariat with complete sincerity and complete loyalty’.)73 He was helped to 
square the circle by the CPGB’s own move rightwards in 1934-35, and he could 
present his ideas as the basis of a popular front economics, as in What Are We To 
Do? (1938). By then, he had absolutely no desire to return to Marxian 
fundamentalism. The events of 1939-40 gave him the perfect opportunity to break 
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with the Communists. When the breach finally came in April 1940, he could argue 
plausibly that, in supporting the British war effort, he was in effect far more anti-
fascist than the Communists who were by now arguing that the war was a struggle of 
rival imperialisms whose outcome was of no significance to the working class. In 
1942 Strachey rejoined the Labour party, and went on to a ministerial career once re-
elected to parliament in 1945. When looked at as a whole, the period in Strachey’s 
political thought that appears aberrant is the early-to-mid 1930s. The aberration is 
best explained by his desire to distance himself from memories of the New party. The 
end product for the CPGB was very positive: for almost a decade, it had at its 
disposal the primary socialist intellectual in Britain. In delivering Strachey to the 
CPGB bound, but certainly not gagged, the New party inadvertently did the cause of 
British communism a good turn.   
 
Taken as a whole, the New party interlude did not have a massive impact on the 
development of the British Communist party. A subject of some attention around the 
time of its formation, it soon retreated in significance, as other issues took priority. 
Nevertheless, it was not entirely unimportant. Initially at least, it appeared to suggest 
that ‘class against class’ analyses of social democrats as social fascists had some 
basis in reality. Secondly, Mosley’s subsequent shift to ‘fully-fledged’ fascism seemed 
to vindicate Communist assertions that he was a fascist even before the New party 
was formed: for once, they appeared to have analysed a situation correctly. Thirdly, 
the formation of the New party did lead the CPGB to pay more attention to its youth 
organisation, and may have increased Communists’ use of political violence, which in 
turn helped recruitment, although not always of the kind of members the party 
leadership wanted. Finally, Strachey’s rather-too-long dalliance with the New party 
pushed him to seek to prove his left-wing, anti-fascist credentials by an association 
with the Communists that was lengthier than it might otherwise have been. And, if for 
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no other reason than that, the New party’s brief existence did ultimately profit the 
Communist party of Great Britain.  
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